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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MADGE FREDRICKSON,

Pla'intiff,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, SEAGULL MOTEL and
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defenda;nts.

Case No.
10785

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendants agree with the plaintiff's Statement
of .B'acts; however, feel that the following amplification
should be made:
Plaintiff suffered an injury during the course of
her employment on July 9, 1959, which was compensable
nuder the Workmen's Compensation Act. The last payment of compensation made by the defendant was on
.January 26, 1960. The only application filed by the plaintiff before The Industrial Commission was that filed on
Nonmber 12, 1965 (R. 7).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN
HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIM WAS BARRED.
Plaintiff states in her brief that the only issue presented to The Industrial Commission in the hearing on
which this appeal is taken was whether or not the cause
of action against the employer-defendant commenced
from the time of the accident or the time the extent of
the industrial injury became apparent. The defendants
agree that this was the issue presented to The Industrial
Commission.
The Hearing Examiner based his decision denying
plaintiff benefits on Sec. 35-1-99 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended. This statute is entitled ''Notice of Injury
and Claim for Compensation - Limitation of Action."
This section basically defines the employee's obligation
in making proper notice of his injury. The statute reads
in part as follows:
"35-1-99 . . . If no notice of the accident and
injury is given to the employer within one year
from the date of the accident, the right to compensation shall be wholly barred. If no claim for
compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within three years from the date of the
accident or the date ~f the last payment of compensation, the right to compensation shall be
wholly barred.''
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The Hearing Examiner relied upon the last sentence
set forth above in ruling that the plaintiff's claim was
barred.
The plaintiff in her brief relies solely on the Utah
case of Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 93 Ut.
510, 74 P.2d 657. This case involved a situation where
the applicant received compensation; however, he believed that his injury had healed and claimed no compensation within six years. The issue presented to the
Court, therefore, was when the cause of action commenced. The Court held, as stated by the plaintiff, that
the cause of action commences when the industrial injury becomes apparent and a claim is made and the
employer or insurance carrier refuses to pay compensation. The Court, in determining the issue, construed
statutes which were part of the Compensation Code of
1937. The Court examined Sec. 104-2-26 R. S. Utah 1933,
which was a general statute of limitation section appearing in the Code of Civil Procedure. This statute reads
in part:
"Within one year:
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6. An action against a municipal corporation for
damages or injury to property caused by a mob
or riot.''

3

Subsequent to this case, the Legislature amended 42-1-92
R. S. Utah 1933 and said amendment is found in 42-1-92
U.C.A. 1943. The amendment to the statute was by the
addition of the following sentence:
"If no claim for compensation is filed with The
Industrial Commission within three years from
the date of the accitlent or the date of the last
payment of compensation, the right to compensation shall he wholly barred."

The Legislature, therefore, specifically set forth a limitation of action provision which provided for Workmen's
Compensation cases and which would he controlfoigrather than the general statute of limitation section 0f
the Code of Civil Procedure relied upon by the Conrt
in Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commissiou, supra. 'rhe
language of this amendment is clt>ar, that is, that the
applicant is barred unless ther0 is a filing with The
Industrial Commission within three years from the
date of accident or from the date of the last payment of
compensation. As mentioned above, it is clear and it is
not disputed by plaintiff in this case that the first filing
with The Industrial Commission was on N owmber 12,
1965, more than five years and nine months later than

the last compensation payment received on Jan nary 26,
1960, based upon an accident that occurred on July 0,
1959.

Our Supreme Court has considered th(_• statute in
question, that is, 35-1-99 U.C.A. 19fl3, as am0nclcd, in
4

McKee vs. Industrial Commission, 115 Ut. 550, 206 P.2d
715. The Court stated that the sole question to be deter-

mined is whether or not this particular section (then
known as Sec. 42-1-92 U.C.A. 1943, as amended,) was an
effective right to bar plaintiff's recovery for compensation. In this case, the employee had experienced back
difficulties during the period of time that the statute of
limitations was running. The plaintiff argued, however,
that he did not have knowledge of the extent of the
injury until after the statute had run. It was conceded
that more than three years had expired from the time
of the accident until the application for compensation
was filed with The Industrial Commission. The applicant claimed that the rule set down in Salt Lake City vs.

Industrial Commission, supra, was controlling and that
the cause of action did not arise until the extent of the
injury became known and the denial of the payment
was made by the employer or the insurance carrier. The
applicant was claiming under almost identical fact situations the same position contended by the plaintiff in
this cause.

The Court, however, at page 658 of the

Pacific Reporter held as follows:
'' ... He contends, however, that the statute did
not begin to run against him until 1947 when he
learned for the first time that his suffering was
uot the result of rheumatism or lumbago. In so
arguing, he relies upon the rule. a~110unced in
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm1ss1on, 93 Utah
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510, 74 P.2d 657, and Williams v. Industrial Commission, 95 Utah 376, 81 P.2d 649. These cases
overruled a line of cases from this court which
had held that Sec. 104-2-26, Rev. St. 1933, a one
year general statute of limitations, commenced
to run on industrial accidents from the time of
the accident. In the cited cases we held that to
follow the rule announced in the earlier cases
might permit the statute to run before a cause
of action accrued inasmuch as an employer's duty
to pay under the Workmen's Compensation Act
did not arise until there was an accident an<l injury and a disability or loss from the injury. We
therefore held that the time prescribed in Sec.
104-2-26 U.C.A. 1943, would start to run from
the time an employee's cause of action arose and
not from the time of the accident.
"(1) Subsequent to these cases and in 1939, the
legislature of this state enacted a statute of limitations which dealt specifical1y with actions
arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
This statute is 42-1-92, U.C.A. 1943, which is
hereinbefore set forth and which provides that
unless an application for compensation is filed
with the Industrial Commission within three
years from the date of the accident or the date
of the last payment of compensation the right to
comp ens a ti on is barred. The language of the
statute is clear and leaves no room for doubt.
Regardless of the decisions rendered by this
court prior to 1939, the law now is that the
limitation statute begins to run from the date
of the accident or from the date of the last payment of compensation.''
The Court held that the legislative enactment which is
found in 42-1-92 U.C.A. 1943, as amended, negates thr
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holding m Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission
'
supra.
It is conceded that the employer or the insurance
carrier can waive by its actions the right to the defense
of this limitation. See McKee vs. Industrial Commission

'

supra, and Utah Apex Mining Co. vs. Industrial, Com-

mission, 116 Ut. 305, 209 P.2d 571. There is no evidence
in this record, nor is it contended by plaintiff, that any
such facts exist in this case.
In a recent Utah case, Jones vs. Industrial Commis-

sion, 17 Ut. 238, 404 P.2d 27, this Court affirmed an
Order of The Industrial Commission denying benefits
based upon 35-1-99 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, on the
grounds that the petitioner had not filed within the
applicable three-year limitation and the Court stated
that the provisions of this statute showed a clear and
obvious legislative intent.
It should be noted that 35-1-100 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, protects the applicant from the situation where
the extent of the injuries are not known or not apparent.
1'he applicant is required to make a filing and with this
filing he oonfers jurisdiction upon The Industrial Com-

mission and if the injury lights up in the future, the
;\ rpliennt is protected.
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CONCLUSION
The Commission did not err in holding that 35-l-D9
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, requires that an applicant is
barred from receiving compensation if no claim is filed
with it within either three years from the date of the
accident or the date of the last payment of compensation.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MOORE
422 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants
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